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Abstract
Dennis Dieks advanced the view that the idea of flow of time is implemented in the
theory  of  relativity.  The  ‘flow’  results  from the  successive  happening/becoming  of
events along the time-like worldline of a material system. This leads to a view of now as
local to each worldline. Each past event of the worldline has occurred once as a now-
point,  and  we  take  there  to  be  an  ever-changing  present  now-point  ‘marking’  the
unfolding of a physical system. In Dieks’ approach there is no preferred worldline and
only along each worldline is there a Newtonian-like linear order between successive
now-points. We have a flow of time per worldline. Also there is no global temporal
order of the now-points of different worldlines. There is, as much, what Dieks calls a
partial order. However Dieks needs for a consistency reason to impose a limitation on
the assignment of the now-points along different worldlines. In this work it is made the
claim that Dieks’ consistency requirement is, in fact, inbuilt in the theory as a spatial
relation  between physical  systems and processes.  Furthermore,  in  this  work we will
consider (very) particular cases of assignments of now-points restricted by this spatial
relation,  in  which  the  now-points  taken  to  be  simultaneous  are  not  relative  to  the
adopted inertial reference frame.
1 Introduction 
When  we  consider  any  experiment  related  to  the  theory  of  relativity,1 like  the
Michelson-Morley experiment (see, e.g., Møller 1955, 26-8), we can always describe it
in terms of an intuitive notion of passage or flow of time: light is send through the two
arms of the interferometer at a particular moment – the now of the experimenter –, and
the process of light propagation takes time to occur, as can be measured by a clock
calibrated to the adopted time scale.
However when we consider the theory, in particular focusing on its development in
terms of the Minkowski space-time and its application using the Minkowski diagrams,
we  immediately  become  puzzled  by  the  implications  of  the  theory  regarding  our
intuitive  notion  of  time,  and  the  passage  or  flow  of  time  seems  difficult  or  even
impossible to ‘find’ in the conceptual-mathematical structure of the theory (see, e.g.,
Dorato 2010, 1-2).  
Several  authors  have  tried  to  ‘find’  in  the  theory  the  notions  of  present/now,
becoming, and passage or flow of time, all taken to be closely related (see, e.g., Dieks
1988, Arthur 2006, Savitt 2009). We will address only one proposition made by Dieks
(1988,  2006).  There  is  no  intention  for  this  work  to  be  conclusive  or  to  give  a
‘definitive’  elaboration  of  Dieks’  approach.  The  intention  is  simply  to  provide,  if
possible, a further development along Dieks’ lines.
1 Instead  of  naming  Einstein’s  two theories  as  special  relativity and  general  relativity,  in  this  work,
adopting Fock (1959) terminology, we refer to the theory of relativity and the theory of gravitation. The
subject of this work is just the theory of relativity not including Einstein’s gravitation theory.
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In this work it is made one basic claim. In Dieks’ approach it is necessary to con-
sider a consistency requirement regarding the relation between different now-points of
different material physical systems. We can consider this requirement to be inbuilt in the
theory from the start. It follows from what we can call a spatial relation that exists be-
tween the physical systems and processes. For the time being we can characterize a spa-
tial relation as one in which only the ‘spatial aspect’ is relevant disregarding whatever
temporal unfolding these systems and processes might have.
In this work we will also consider particular cases in which, by a further setting of
‘initial conditions’, the relation between the now-points of different physical systems, in
relative (inertial) motion or non-inertial motion, can be determined in a way that does
not depend on the particular inertial reference frame adopted. It is important to notice
that, in general, this is not possible. The spatial relation between physical systems is not
sufficient, by itself, to avoid that the set of now-points of different physical systems
taken to be simultaneous is relative to the adopted inertial reference frame.
This paper is organized as follows. In part 2 it is presented Dieks’ approach in terms
of a now-point per worldline, and mentioned how it enables to maintain a notion of be-
coming/flow of time in the theory when taking into account the so-called relativity of si-
multaneity. In part 3 we see how Dieks’ consistency requirement is already implicit in
the theory, by taking into account that in the theory we consider physical systems and
processes that have a spatial relation between them. In part 4 it is addressed the so-
called time dilation and several situations in which besides the spatial relation we con-
sider a further stipulation of the initial time phase of different physical systems (in iner-
tial or non-inertial motion). For these particular cases the relation between the now-
points of the different physical systems is similar to that of classical mechanics: it does
not depend on the adopted inertial reference frame. In the epilogue we return once again
to the relativity of simultaneity taking into account the views presented in the work. In
the appendix it is addressed the issue of how the flow of time can be seen to be imple-
mented in the Minkowski diagrams.
2 Dieks’ view on the flow of time in the theory of relativity
Several authors consider that the notion of passage of time is encapsulated in the theory
of relativity through the concept of proper time (see, e.g., Dieks 1988; Arthur 2008;
Savitt 2009).2 This view is elaborated in connection with the notion of present or now.
The time lapse/passage/flow is related with becoming present, the successive happening
of events, or succession of presents  (see, e.g., Dieks 1988, 2006; Arthur 2008; Savitt
2009, 2011).3 In this way the idea that proper time measures/gives the passage of time is
entangled with the notion of present or now. 
2 The proper time was defined/discovered by Minkowski in his famous 1908 work. By definition the pro-
per time is associated only to material systems to which one always associates time-like worldlines.  For
this particular case one considers the invariant infinitesimal interval along the worldline at the position of
the material system c2dτ2 = c2dt2 - dx2 - dy2 - dz2. According to Minkowski “the integral ∫dτ = τ of this
magnitude, taken along the worldline from any fixed starting point P0 to the variable end point P, we call
the proper time of the substantial point at P” (Minkowski 1908, 45). Immediately after this definition, Mi-
nkowski applies the concept of proper time as the time gone by a physical system to determine the mo-
tion-vector and acceleration-vector of a substantial point (material system).
3 In  this  paper  it  is  not  presented  a  detailed  analysis  of  these  terms,  their  possible differences,  and
philosophical  connotations. The only point  been made is that the time lapse of a physical  system (as
measured/given by the proper time) is ‘marking’ the (local) now of this physical system.
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This proposition is made in part as a ‘solution’ to the difficulty to implement a no-
tion of passage or now in the theory of relativity due to the relativity of simultaneity
(see, e.g., Savitt 2013). To see how the problem and its solution arise let us consider first
Newton’s theory (more exactly classical mechanics). In this case we might identify the
flow or transience with the inertial time. The changes, evolution, or motion of physical
systems are described in terms of a common temporal parameter – the universal inertial
time.4, 5 This temporal parameter is the same for all physical systems in inertial motion
or not. This means, in particular, that all inertial reference frames share the same coordi-
nate (inertial) time.6 This view can also be expressed in terms of a (Galilian) four di-
mensional space-time. We can see that the passage of time, as determined by a unique
universal time, results in the becoming of a set of events – a hyperplane of simultaneity
(the Euclidean space) existing now (see, e.g., DiSalle 2009; Friedman 1983, chapter 3;
Savitt 2006, 14; Savitt 2013).
In the case of the theory of relativity it is not possible to consider a hypersurface of
events (of the space-time) as simultaneous (i.e. occurring now) for all inertial reference
frames.7 Contrary to the Newtonian case, each inertial reference frame (in relative mo-
tion) has a different hyperplane of simultaneous events (i.e. with the same time coordi-
nate), which is a Euclidean space. In this way, there is not a unique set of events corre-
sponding to a unique now shared by all inertial reference frames. This result leads to the
relativity of simultaneity. 
This situation might imply that there is no place in the theory of relativity for any
notion of time flow (or notions taken to be related to it like becoming). For example, ac-
cording to Gödel (1949), since each observer has a different set of ‘nows’ (i.e. takes dif-
ferent events to be simultaneous to what he/she considers to be/have been his/her now-
point), there is no ‘objective’ lapse/flow of time. Time would be ‘ideal’, i.e. a product of
consciousness. Gödelian-like views on time in the theory of relativity have ‘coalesced’
in the so-called block universe view: al events of the Minkowski space-time co-exist
tenselessly (see, e.g., Dieks 2006, 168-9; Dorato 2008, 56-9). These views take the time
lapse, if it was to have existed in the theory, to have to be given by the coordinate time
4 As expressed in the law of inertia, a body in inertial motion takes equal time intervals to travel identical
distances in any inertial reference frame: there is a time scale implied in the inertial motion – the inertial
time (see, e.g., Torretti 1983, 16-7; DiSalle 1990, 141). Since no inertial body (or inertial reference frame)
can be differentiated regarding its motion from other inertial bodies (i.e. all inertial motions are physically
equivalent), this means that all inertial bodies share the same inertial time (this can be seen already as a
consequence of a restricted form of the principle of relativity expressed in the law of inertia).
5 Arthur,  like  Savitt  (2011a),  defends  the  view  that  in  the  theory  of  relativity  the  concept  of  time
bifurcates in two different notions: coordinate time and proper time. We will not address this view in this
work. To the purpose of this work it is sufficient to consider that there is a temporal notion in the theory –
the proper time, associated to material systems, which does not depend on the adopted inertial reference
frame. In the case of an inertial motion (the most important for the views developed in this work), the
proper time of a material system is identical to its inertial time; in the case of an accelerated motion, its
invariant proper time is calculated from the coordinate time of any adopted inertial reference frame. If
there is or there is not a clear-cut distinction between proper time and inertial/coordinate time (i.e. a clear-
cut bifurcation of time) does not affect the ‘basic’ aspect of proper time that is relevant in this work: the
flow of time of a physical system is given by its proper time.
6 According to Torretti there is an implicit assumption regarding the (eventual) synchronization of distant
clocks being made to arrive at this result (Torretti 1983, 13). Another possibility is to consider that this
result follows from considering Newton’s theory in conjugation to his gravitation theory in which the
gravitational action-at-a-distance are instantaneous; this ‘imposes’ an (implicit) synchronization of distant
clocks (Brown 2005, 20).
7 A plane/hyperplane/hypersurface of simultaneity in a particular inertial reference frame is the set of
events that have the same time coordinate in this inertial reference frame.
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of the different inertial reference frames. A way out might be to take proper time to give
the elapsed time and the becoming present of a physical system (see, e.g. Arthur 2008).
According to Dieks the theory of relatively teaches us that it is not necessary to rely
on the idea of a succession of cosmic nows. In his view, “if we want to make sense of
becoming we should attempt to interpret it  as something purely local” (Dieks, 2006,
157); one must consider the successive happening of physically related events from the
perspective of “their own spacetime locations” (Dieks 2006, 157). This points to the
centrality of the concept of proper time in the theory of relativity.
 As it is well known, only events on the past light cone can affect us (taken our
now-point to be the apex of ‘our’ light cone), and only events in the future light cone
can be affected by us (see, e.g., Callahan 2000, 76-7); in relation to us, these events are
“unambiguously temporally ordered” (Dieks 2006, 158). Regarding events space-like
separated  from  us,  since  there  is  no  action-at-a-distance,  we  cannot  have  a  direct
physical interaction with them. How the simultaneity of some of these events to us is
defined/determined, has “no influence on the content of our observations" (Dieks 2006,
158), which is taken to be local.8 According to Dieks,
we do not need a succession of a definite set of global simultaneity hyperplanes in
order  to  accommodate  our  experience  ...  completely different  choices  of  such
hyperplanes lead to the same local experiences ... we do not have to bother about
global simultaneity at all. If we decided to scrap the term 'simultaneity' from our
theoretical  vocabulary,  no  problem  would  arise  for  doing  justice  to  our
observations. (Dieks 2006, 160)
The  importance  of  the  relativity  of  simultaneity  would  not  be  directly  related  to
questions regarding the time ordering of distant events, but in pointing to the crucial
aspect that the temporal experience is local. 
Dieks proposes to reformulate the idea of flow of time based on the concept of
proper  time.  According  to  Dieks  “only time  along  worldlines (proper  time)  has  an
immediate and absolute significance as an ordering parameter of physical processes”
(Dieks, 1988, 456). However since there is not in the theory of relativity any preferred
worldline (or associated reference frame; as it is the case of Lorentz’s electron theory
with its preferred ether based reference frame), there is no way to single out a particular
worldline and its private now. Accordingly, “it is not appropriate to define one universal
‘now’; instead, we have to assign a now-point to every single worldline” (Dieks 1988,
458). The flow of time is contained in the theory if we consider that “each point of the
worldline has to occur once as ‘now-point’” (Dieks 1988, 458).9 Dieks’ view is that,
contrary to earlier views on time, the relativistic framework leads to a generalization of
the universal flow of time, which Dieks refers to as flow of time per worldline (Dieks
1988, 459). This approach leads to a ‘many-fingered’ view of time; each worldline has
8 This  does  not  mean that  we cannot  have  a  local  experience  related  to  an  event  with  a  space-like
separation from us; e.g., we can receive light emitted in/with a particular event that will later arrive at
what will be our now-point. 
9 There is a ‘variant’ to this approach in which the notion of local present/now along a worldline is not
restricted to a now-point. The motivation for this proposition seems to be outside physics. While Dieks
regards that an (human) observation can be represented by a point-event (Dieks 2006, 3), the notion of
psychological  present  seems to point,  according to  some,  to  a  physical  representation  of  the now as
extended. The events that are part of our now are the ones with which we can interact during a short
interval  of  our proper time. Instead of a now-point,  the present  is  a  region of  space-time comprised
between the future light cone of the ‘beginning’ e1 and the past light cone of the ‘end’ e2 of our extended
present (see, e.g., Arthur 2006; Savitt 2009; Dorato 2011). It is beyond the scope of this work to address
the proposition of an extended now. 
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its own now-point. However, this view might lead to a consistency problem. According
to Dieks
an arbitrary assignment of now-points to the worldlines will not do, however, for
the following reason. The idea of a flow of time combined with the ontological
definiteness  of  present  and  past  requires  that  everything  that  is  in  the  past
lightcone of an event that is ontologically defined is also ontologically define.
This  leads  to  the  demand  that  no  now-point  should  lie  in  the  interior  of  the
conjunction of the past lightcones of the other now-points. (Dieks 1988, 458)
To see this approach at work, let us consider an example given by Petkov (2009). We
have two observers A and B in relative motion;10 we can regard the observers to be lo-
cated at the origin of two inertial reference frames and carrying a clock each. Let C1 and
C2 be two clocks from A’s inertial reference frame (at some location -d and +d).  As it is
usually done, we consider that A and B meet at event M (i.e. that there is a moment in
which the origins of the references frames coincide) and that they set the clocks to tA =
tB = 5 (see Figure 1, which gives a schematic representation of the worldliness of A, B,
C1, and C2, and the planes of simultaneity of A and B).11
Figure 1
According to Petkov, when identifying the ‘now’ to the clock’s proper time, “to ob-
server A, both clocks exist at the 5th second of the coordinate time measured in A’s refer-
ence frame” (Petkov 2009, 129); in this way, 
as in an  inertial  reference frame the coordinate (global) time coincides with the
proper times of all objects at rest in that frame, it follows that A comes to the con-
clusion that C1 and C2 both exist at the 5th second of their proper times. (Petkov
2009, 129)12
10 As it is a current practice in some of the physics literature we will adopt the notion of ‘observer’ as an
agent  in  inertial  motion  making  spatial  and  time  intervals  measurements.  The  agent  sets  an  inertial
reference frame – simply by stipulating the phase of a ‘master’ clock – considering herself to be located at
the origin of this ‘frame’ (see, e.g., Bondi 1965, 71-92; Bohm 1965, 131-45; Ludvigsen 1999, 12-7).
11 To simplify, in this work we will adopt a unit of time such that the speed of light is taken to be equal to
one. This will enable in diagrams to represent the paths (worldlines) of light signals/pulses always by
straight lines having an angle of 45º relative to the space and time axes (see,  e.g.,  Bohm 1965, 132;
Wheeler  and Taylor  1963,  17-8).  Also,  in  this  work  it  will  be  considered  just  one  spatial  direction
identified with the letter x.
12 Petkov identifies the numerical value of the coordinate time with the proper time in the case of an
inertial  motion.  However,  even if  accepting Arthur’s  clear-cut  bifurcation of  time, we must  grant  to
Petkov that when in inertial motion a physical system’s inertial time – which is numerically equal in this
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The problem with this approach is that due to the relativity of simultaneity, “what is si-
multaneous for A, however, is not simultaneous for B” (Petkov 2009, 129). When con-
sidering B’s plane of simultaneity we see that 
what is simultaneous for B at the 5th second of B’s time (when B meets A at M) is
clock C1 existing at the 8th second of its proper time and clock C2 existing at the 2th
second of its proper time. Therefore, for B the moment ‘now’ of the proper time of
C1 is the 8th second, whereas the present moment of C2 is the 2th second of its
proper time. (Petkov 2009, 129)
As a result,  “when A and B meet  at  M, they will  disagree on which is the present
moment of each of the clocks” (Petkov 2009, 129). If we accept both  hyperplanes of
simultaneity as giving the common/global now of all physical systems, we would face
the paradoxical situation that C1 and C2 would exist at once in different moments of
their proper time.
But with Dieks the now is not defined in terms of simultaneity. The now/present is
local to each worldline As Dieks mentions, “we do not need a succession of a definite
set of global simultaneity hyperplanes in order to accommodate out experience” (Dieks
2006, 4). The fact that A and B take different elapsed times of C1 and C2 as now for
them is not problematic regarding the now-points of C1 and C2 (whatever these might
be), if these events are occurring or have already occurred to C1 and C2, i.e. if they are
present or past events in the ordered temporal relation within each worldline of each
physical system C1 and C2. What is necessary, regarding the relation between the now-
points of A, B, C1, and C2, is that the assignment of a now-point to each worldline is
made in a way that “no now-point should lie in the interior of the conjugation of the past
lightcones  of  the other  now-points” (Dieks 1988, 458).  In this  approach it  seems it
might be possible to make compatible a local view on passage and the inexistence of a
global now. However there seems to be no physical relation between the different now-
points. As it is, by now, in Dieks’ approach, we must regard the now-points as simply
set by hand as initial conditions in case-by-case applications. 
That is not totally the case. As we will just see, there is in fact a need to set at least
the initial relation between the now-points of two inertial observers. But this is con-
strained and in fact made possible by the fact that these material physical systems are
taken from the start, in the development of the theory, to have a particular relation be-
tween them, which turn out to be a spatial relation.
3 Dieks’ consistency requirement as implicitly determined in the theory from the spatial
co-existence of physical systems and processes 
Let us consider an inertial reference frame made of a set of inertial bodies – to simplify,
clocks – at relative rest.  Adopting Dieks’ view of a now-point per worldline we might
ask about the passage of time of the clocks of the inertial reference frame and the rela-
tion between their respective now-points. Contrary to Einstein’s views we do not need
an explicit  implementation of  a  synchronization  procedure  using the propagation of
light to establish the simultaneity between distant clocks (see, e.g., Einstein 1910, 126-
7; Darrigol 2005). It is sufficient to choose the phase of a ‘master’ clock and to take into
case to its proper time – gives, because of this equality, the time lapse for this physical system.
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account the constancy of the one-way speed of light.13 This already sets a coordinate
time associated to the inertial master clock.14 Being at rest in relation to the master clock
the phases of the other clocks are already implicitly determined, being realized, e.g.,
when an actual light pulse emitted from the master clock reaches another clock.
There is a possible oversimplification being made in this approach. If we think in
terms of  just  one inertial  body and its  worldline (e.g.  the observer  with her master
clock), then by choosing a particular temporal phase the coordinate time in empty space
would be fixed. In this case, we would be taking for granted that there is already a
meaningful notion of metrical spatial  distance associated to ‘empty space’. To avoid
thinking in terms of just one material body in empty space we might resort to Einstein’s
notion of body of reference. In the context of the theory of relativity, Einstein avoids
speaking of space (mathematical Euclidean space) in abstract. The (Euclidean) space of
reference is thought in terms of the space of/associated to an extended material body –
the body of reference, taken to be in inertial motion (see, e.g., Einstein 1955; Paty 1992,
24-5).
We can think of our body of reference, as an inertial reference frame, enabling spa-
tial and temporal determinations, constituted, e.g., by  ‘elementary’ physical systems –
rods and clocks.  In particular let us consider a measuring rod A (adopted as our unit of
length). According to Einstein, let us 
[bring] bodies B, C, . . . up to body A; we say that we continue body A. We can
continue body A in such a way that it comes into contact with any other body, X.
The ensemble of all continuations of body A we can designate as the ‘space of the
body A’. (Einstein 1955,6)
All these material continuations of the body A, constituting the body of reference, are
spatially present to each other. The master clock and the other clocks can be seen as
having a metrical spatial relation determined in the context of this ever-present body of
reference.
It terms of Dieks’ approach we can see the different inertial bodies (clocks) at rela-
tive rest some distance apart in terms of worldlines. Thinking of our master clock as lo-
cated at the surface of an extended material body (in inertial motion), it seems reasona-
ble to consider that the other clocks at rest in relation to the extended inertial body have
their now-points in the elsewhere of the master clock. This is so because, in this case,
we expect the interval between the now-points to be space-like.15 This would imply that,
independently of the precise now-point each one might have, they are already in accor-
dance with the consistency requirement mentioned by Dieks regarding the relations be-
13 This implies taking the so-called one-way speed of light to be the same in all directions. There are
authors that take this to be a conventional choice (see, e.g., Anderson et al. 1998, 16).
14 In the theory of relativity the definition of the coordinate time of an inertial body or inertial reference
frame from the inertial time can be implemented in a unique way, because we do not rely only on the law
of inertia, which determines a unique inertial time but not a unique coordinate time (Torretti 1983, 53).
There  is  besides  the  law of  inertia  of  material  bodies  what  we  might  call  the  law of  inertia  of  the
electromagnetic  field (Fock 1959, 8;  Torretti  1983, 55):  light  traverses  equal distances  in equal  time
intervals  with the same speed in all  directions. By taking into account  light’s  inertial  properties,  the
coordinate time associated to an inertial body or inertial reference frame is uniquely determined from the
inertial time simply by choosing a ‘master’ clock associated to the inertial body (or inertial reference
frame) and setting its ‘initial’ phase. If a light pulse is send from the position x and arrives at the origin
when the master clock reads t, then we know that the event “sending the light pulse” occurred t - x/c
seconds ago in terms of the coordinate time of the inertial reference frame.
15 Considering events e1 and e2 that have a space-like separation, i.e. for which ∆x2 > c2 ∆t2, one says that
e2 is in the elsewhere of e1 (see, e.g. Bohm 1965, 146-154; Schutz 1985, 10-15).
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tween now-points. This, however, does not seem to assign in a unequivocal way the
now-points of the clocks of the  inertial reference frame. 
There is however an element that is not yet explicitly taken into account. The iner-
tial bodies at relative rest can, e.g., exchange light. We do not need to assign by hand the
now-point of each inertial body at relative rest so that we can ascertain that a light signal
send by one of the inertial bodies will reach another one.16 If we imagine the clocks of
the inertial reference frame as inertial worldlines with different now-points previous to
defining an inertial reference frame, and from a particular now-point of a clock is emi-
tted a light signal to another clock (in its elsewhere), the second clock’s now-point is
fixed due to its spatial relation (e.g. the belonging to the extended inertial reference fra-
me) to the first clock, otherwise it would not receive the light. This is an important point
since it shows, contrary to Dieks’ consistency requirement, that the relation between the
now-points of different clocks of an inertial reference frame is at least partially determi-
ned by something more than the consistency requirement.  
The key aspect to be taken into account is that we are considering from the start
physical systems that, e.g., can be brought together side-by-side or moved around in
relation to each other. We are considering what we might refer to as physical systems
that have a spatial relation between them. They co-exist as spatial things: things that are
spatially  located  in  relation  to  each  other  (independently  of  their  local
unfolding/passage/change). 
When we start to speak in terms of ‘spatially located’, ‘spatial thing’ or ‘spatial re-
lations’ it gives the impression that there is something vague and ‘unscientific’ in this
terminology. This does not have to be the case. According to Dieks,  
‘being something spatial’ is a quality whose content is not fixed by saying that it
belongs to elements possessing [e.g.] the interrelations of the points of the Eu-
clidean plane … to fix the reference to spatial thing something additional must be
invoked. A natural move to make is to embed ourselves in the network of rela-
tions, and to identify some of the experiential relations between ourselves and the
world around us as spatial. (Dieks 2006, 171-2)17
An example of a ‘natural network’ of relations involving our experience in the world is
given by practical implementations of the notion of inertial reference frame. Let us con-
sider an extended body like the Earth and satellites orbiting it. In practice one uses a
network of satellites to ‘calculate’ an inertial reference frame (see, e.g., Barbour 1989,
665-6). The satellites are spatially located in relation to each other, to the Earth, and to
us; we all co-exist as spatial things.
The realization that physical systems are spatial co-existent makes possible for the
particular case of physical systems belonging to/constituting an inertial reference frame
to settle/determine a coordinate time shared by all of them. That is, because these physi-
cal systems are spatially co-existent we can determine a shared coordinate time in all the
inertial reference frame built from the identical inertial time of the physical systems, e.g.
by exchanging light between them. Saying this in other words: in this case, the relation
between the now-points of the physical systems is fixed; they all share the same tempo-
ral parameter.
16 We can  imagine  e.g.  two observers  at  the surface  of  an  extended body (in  inertial  motion)  some
distance apart and exchanging light signals.  
17 Dieks makes these remarks in a context different from that developed in the present paper, in relation to
a tentative ‘grasping’ of the notion of ‘temporality’.
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It might seem obvious that material bodies can exchange light between them or
even be side-by-side at relative rest or momentarily when, e.g., in relative motion. How-
ever, when starting from a view in terms of worldlines, each one with its local now-
point this result is not self-evident. For example, the possibility that time-like worldlines
might cross or that time-like worldlines can have their now-points connected by light-
like worldlines (i.e. the worldlines of light signals/pulses) is not ‘covered’ by Dieks’
consistency  requirement  regarding  the  relation  between  the  now-points  of  different
time-like worldlines. This follows when taking into account that the theory is built by
considering physical  systems (like material  bodies)  and physical  processes  (like the
propagation of light) that co-exist spatially. Dieks’ consistency requirement then follows
from this spatial co-existence; i.e. for physical systems that are spatially co-existent it
follows that the relation between their now-points is such that no now-point of a physi-
cal system lies in the interior of the conjugation of the past light cones of the other phys-
ical systems.
We can imagine, for this particular case, that our inertial bodies are part of/exist in a
three-dimensional spatial ‘manifold’ whose spatial metric relation is not determined in-
dependently of this set of inertial bodies at relative rest chosen to constitute an inertial
reference frame. Each of these physical systems immersed in the spatial ‘manifold’ has
a temporal unfolding given by its proper time. In the case of any inertial reference frame
the relation between the unfolding/becoming of its ‘members’ is fixed and can be de-
scribed in terms of a common temporal parameter – the coordinate time.
4 A new look into Dieks’ now-point per worldline view taking into account the spatial
co-existence of physical systems 
As mentioned, all material bodies in inertial motion share the inertial time. This implies,
in particular, that if we consider a clock in relative motion in relation to an inertial refer-
ence frame, it has the same rate as all the clocks of the inertial reference frame. How-
ever, as it is well known, from the perspective of the inertial reference frame the clock
in relative motion has a smaller rate (this is the so-called time dilation). But this is also
the case when measuring with the clock in relative motion the rate of any clock of the
inertial reference frame; the clocks of the inertial reference frame will appear to run at a
slower rate. This might give the impression that the time dilation is not real. In fact, the
relative retardation of clocks moving inertially in relation to each other has nothing to
do with the rate of the clocks as such, otherwise the principle of relativity would not be
valid (see, e.g., Bohm 1965, 131-40; Smith 1965, 57; solution to problem 30 in chapter
1 of Wheeler and Taylor 1963). 
Let us consider a clock A located side-by-side with an identical clock O of the iner-
tial reference frame. At the moment that clock O gives/reads zero, clock A is boosted to
a state of relative motion with an initial phase of zero (see, e.g., Brown 2005, 30).   It is
evident that in Dieks’ terms their initial now-points coincide. This is not in disagreement
with  Dieks’ consistency  requirement  regarding  the  relation  between  different  now-
points. In terms of the view presented here both clocks co-exist spatially, and this im-
plies, in particular, that when side-by-side they have the same now-point. Both clocks
send light pulses to the other T0 seconds apart. The successive light pulses arrive at the
other clock T = kT0 seconds apart, where k = sqrt((1 + υ/c)/(1 - υ/c)). This is the rela-
tivistic Doppler effect (see figure 2). Let us determine the rate of clock A as measured
by clock O. When clock A measures a time interval of T = kT0, it is located in relation to
clock O in a position corresponding to a time t as measured by clock O.  Calculating the
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time reading t measured by the clock O that corresponds to the time reading T measured
by the clock A, we have t = T/ sqrt(1 - υ2/c2). If we calculate in exactly the same way the
rate of clock O as measured by clock A we arrive at the same result (see, e.g., Bohm
1965, 134-140). The measurement of the time gone by clock A (O) made by clock O (A)
as predicted by the theory is in agreement with experimental results (Zhang 1997, 175-
200); in this sense we take the time dilation to be ‘real’. 
Figure 2
When analyzing the time dilation in terms of space-time diagrams (including the ‘axes’
of two inertial reference frames, but choosing one of the inertial reference frames as the
‘rest’ frame; see figure 3) the situation might seem incompatible with the possibility of
having the same temporal value of the becoming (i.e. both now-points having the same
value of the time parameter). When observer A reads, e.g., 10s in her master clock she,
later, upon receiving light emitted by observer B at his now-point corresponding to, e.g.,
t' = 8s, considers that this is the now-point of B that was now with her t = 10s. In the
same way observer B takes the now-point of A with t = 8s to have been now with his t' =
10s. However if we take the diagram at ‘face value’ it might seem that A’s t = 10s is to A
simultaneous with B’s t’ = 8s (corresponding to the S plane) and B’s t’ = 10s is to B si-
multaneous with A’s t = 8s (corresponding to the S’ plane). This might give the impres-
sion that the diagram (and the Minkowski space-time) is incompatible with any notion
of flow of time or passage. It seems that we have two simultaneity planes (S and S’)
given ‘at once’ in a fixed diagrammatic representation of the four-dimensional manifold
(see, e.g., Petkov 2005). 
Figure 3
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However we must recall that if the now of a physical system is given by its proper time
and the principle of relativity is valid, it follows that both observer A and B must be
taken to read 10s at the ‘same time’, i.e. as their corresponding now-points: since the
clocks when side-by-side had the same now-point and both have a local flow of time ac-
cording to inertial time, their current space-time now-points have the same temporal
value. We can conclude that, even if they are in the elsewhere of each other, if one of the
clocks has gone by t seconds the other clock in relative motion has gone also by t sec-
onds. This follows from the principle of relativity. 
Returning to our image of a three-dimensional spatial ‘manifold’, if we imagine be-
ing outside the spatial ‘manifold’ seeing instantaneously the evolution of each physical
system, we would see both master clocks reading 10s. However our experiments and
observations must be described as ‘internal’ to the spatial ‘manifold’. As Dieks calls the
attention to, the content of our observations is local. The temporal relation between dis-
tant events can only be reconstructed through, e.g., the exchange of light; and this intro-
duces  a  ‘distortion’ in  the  determination of  the  now-points  corresponding to  an ob-
server’s now-point. Both A and B are equivalent physical systems in inertial motion
with identical clocks; when side-by-side they set the phase of their clocks to zero. If one
goes by t seconds then the other also goes by t seconds. If observer A wants to deter-
mine the temporal values t’ and t corresponding to the physical event “reflection by B of
light send by A”, she can determine t by sending a light pulse to B at her time reading t0,
which is reflected by B and arrives back at A at her time reading t1. 
 We can imagine that the light pulse send back by B ‘carries’ the information of B’s
proper time reading t’ at the moment that light is reflected by him. This means that when
the light returns to A she has access to B’s time reading. Then A calculates, by taking
into account that the speed of light is the same in both directions and independent of her
or B’s (relative) motion, the event along her worldline that corresponds to that particular
event in B’s worldline. To A the time reading of observer B when he sends back the
light pulse is t = t0 + (t1 - t0)/2 (see, e.g., Bohm 1965, 143). 
The relation between the measured value t’ and the partially measured and partially
calculated value t agrees, within the scope of application of the theory, with the theoreti-
cal prediction: as we have just seen, B’s time reading (as determined by his proper time)
when the light is reflected by him is equal to kt0, i.e. the temporal value of the now-
point corresponding to the reflection of the light pulse is according to B t’ = t sqrt(1-
υ2/c2).
This ‘experimental procedure’ (or any other) to measure according to A the time
reading of B enables a reconstruction at A’s ‘current’ now (given by t1) of the temporal
relation between past events of A and B that had a space-like interval between them. 
When A and B determine, by exchanging light, the events of the other correspond-
ing to their current/past now-points, they arrive at the result that there is a time dilation.
It gives the impression that when A is e.g. in her now-point with t = 10s, B is so to speak
in the past in his now-point corresponding to t’ = 8s. The same happens to B, which
when reading 10s in his master clock will, later by calculation/measurement, determine
that A’s corresponding now-point was in his past, since B considers that A’s now-point
corresponded to her t = 8s. However that is not the case; A and B can calculate away the
relativistic effect simply by recalling that both have the same proper time reading ac-
cording to the principle of relativity: when A’s clock is reading 10 seconds B’s clocks is
also reading 10 seconds. 
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This result, as such, only applies to the particular case of these two inertial bodies
that besides being in spatial co-existence (a necessary prerequisite) defined their respec-
tive coordinate times by setting their phases to the same value when side-by-side. If we
consider another inertial body C in relative motion that was not side-by-side with A and
B the situation is more intricate.  We start with the knowledge that C co-exists with A
and B; this means that even if due to its particular state of inertial motion body C might
not ever be momentarily side-by-side with A or B it can nevertheless exchange light
with them. This restricts the ‘position’ of its now-point in relation to the now-points of A
and B. Let us consider that when t = t’ = 0 light is emitted from A and B and that it ar -
rives at C when A’s clock is reading T (A can determine this value calculating it from
the time 2T that light takes to arrive back at A; see figure 4). We know that B attributes
a different time of arrival according to his clock, let us call it T’. 
Figure 4
According to the clock of C the physical event “reflection of light by C” occurs at some
value τC of her/his proper time. The phase of C’ clock was not ‘initially’ set to that of A
or B. She/he can take the moment at which this particular physical event occurs to set
the phase to, e.g., zero, or simply leave the value as τC. The moment at which light ar-
rives at C can be characterized by the temporal value of her/his now-point. If fact from
C’s perspective her/his now-point is given by her/his position xC = 0 and the value τC of
her/his proper time. The trajectory of C in A and B’s inertial reference frames, or more
exactly her/his worldline can be seen as made of her/his successive now-points repre-
senting, e.g., the succession of moments on which C is reflecting light pulses send by A
and B. Each now-point of C corresponds to a coordinate time of A and a coordinate time
of B that do not coincide (as in the case depicted in figure 4). This is simply an example
of the difference in the planes of simultaneity of two inertial observers in relative mo-
tion. If we now ask what is the ‘set’ of now-points (in terms of the values of the proper
times of A, B and C) that are simultaneous, the situation becomes much more intricate
than the simpler case of the two inertial observers with identical initial phase. In that
case, as we have seen, when A reads, e.g., 10s she will consider that the simultaneous
now-point of B corresponds to, e.g., t’ = 8s; however this set of now-points is relative to
adopting A as our reference observer, i.e. as the observer taken to be at (relative) rest. If
we make the same question from B’s perspective, when B reads 10s he, later, takes the
corresponding now-point of A to be the one with the temporal value of t = 8s. In this
case since they set their ‘initial phases’ to zero we can actually say that both have gone
by 10s. When considering another inertial observer C that has not set her/his phase with
that of A and B simultaneously we still can determine the set of simultaneous now-
points relative to the adopted observer. In this way when A reads 10s, and takes B to
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read 8s, she considers that C corresponding moment is that in which her/his clock reads,
e.g., τC1. However B considers, when reading 10s, that A reads 8s and C reads, e.g., τC1’.
In this case we cannot determine what is the ‘actual’ value τC of the now-point of C that
corresponds to A and B reading 10s since we lack, e.g., the initial simultaneous stipula-
tion of the phase of C’s clock with that of A and B. 
This does not mean that there is nothing more we can say about the passage of time
of C in relation to that of A and B. Let us consider the inertial motion of C (as deter-
mined by A and B) between her/his time reading τC1 and τC2. The amount of proper time
gone by C as determined by A or B is given by ∆τ = τC2 - τ C1 = (t2 - t1) sqrt(1 - (υCA/c)2)=
(t2’- t1’) sqrt(1 - (υCB/c)2), where t1 (t1’) and t2 (t2’) are the time coordinates of the now-
points corresponding to τC1 and τC2 as determined by A (B), and υCA (υCB) is the velocity
of C according to A (B). We again arrive at the time dilation formula. However, we al-
ready know that if an inertial body goes by a proper time interval of ∆τ, independently
that other inertial bodies in relative motion ascribe to this time interval values deter-
mined by the time dilation formula ∆t = ∆τ/(1 - (υ/c)2), it goes by the same amount of
proper time that these other inertial bodies go by/through. We arrive at the result that the
inertial bodies are unfolding at the same pace given by the inertial time; something that
we already knew from the principle of relativity.
This  result  can be seen as  shared with classical  mechanics,  when reinterpreting
Newton’s notion of absolute time locally in terms of the proper time of material bodies
(see, e.g., Misner et al. 1973, 289-90). However in Newton’s case we take for granted
that all inertial bodies have set their ‘initial’ time to the same value, even if at-a-distance
(e.g. by an instantaneous action-at-a-distance; see, e.g. Brown 2005, 20; Torretti 1983,
13); and that all coordinate systems have identical time coordinates, according to each
other (as we can check, e.g., from the Galilean/Galilei transformations; see, e.g., Torretti
1983, 28-9). This implies that the set of simultaneous now-points is clearly defined: (1)
all inertial bodies unfold according to the inertial time; (2) all have their initial phase set
to the same value; (3) the now-points of all is given/determined by the adopted coordi-
nate time. Furthermore, conditions 1 to 3 apply also to the case of non-inertial bodies. 
In the case of the theory of relativity, as we will see, we only have (1) for inertial
bodies; (2) applies only to inertial bodies that have their temporal phase set initially in a
way that we might consider simultaneous; (3) only applies in the case where (2) applies.
It might still be possible to think in terms of a three-dimensional spatial ‘manifold’
in which the inertial bodies co-exist. The temporal unfolding of all of them is given by
the inertial time and this unfolding is ‘fixed’ to the three-dimensional ‘platform’. How-
ever if we want to relate the proper time values of the now-points of all the inertial bod-
ies this is made by resort to the exchange of light (that travels through the three-dimen-
sional space between the inertial bodies). There is no unique way to ‘sort’ the temporal
values of the now-points, since we have not set the phases of all of them as a sort of
‘initial condition’ (i.e. there is no unique set/net of simultaneous now-points established
on the three-dimensional spatial ‘manifold’).18
To approach a more Newtonian outlook we might consider an extra hypothesis that
of a sort of cosmic time (given by the shared inertial time with the same initial phase for
all physical systems) for which conditions 1, 2, and 3 apply. For example, we impose a
sort of big bang in which all material systems arise from a particular location at the
same moment. However to do this in the context of the theory of relativity in which we
use a four-dimensional manifold of events (independently of how we interpret it) seems
18 It is beyond the scope of this work to try to articulate mathematically the idea of a three-dimensional
spatial ‘manifold’ in which the unfolding of different physical systems might be given by their respective
proper times, without having the initial phases of all the physical systems set ‘simultaneously’. 
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to push too much the theory and not to do justice to the experimental situations in which
the theory is applied, for which this kind of ‘initial condition’ seems out of place.
The situation is less cumbersome than we might think when addressing the issue of
the flow of time in the theory of relativity as compared to classical mechanics. The de-
scription of physical processes in the theory of relativity is made with inertial reference
frames;19 these inertial reference frames have their ‘initial conditions’ set: we take their
initial event (0, 0) to coincide, in this way setting the phase of their master clocks. All of
the master clocks give us the time lapse (which corresponds simply to the coordinate-in-
ertial-proper  time of each observer). When changing from one observer to another we
must not get distracted by the time dilation and remember that all go through the same
amount of inertial time. This means that if we change from observer A to observer B to
describe physical events and processes and A’s proper time reads 10s then we must ‘pick
up’ B in his 10th moment of time.
The temporal unfolding of all other material bodies and physical processes can be
described in terms of this inertial time, marking the flow of time. Let us look at the case
of non-inertial material bodies, i.e. material bodies that are accelerated. Let us consider
an accelerated motion of a body D between two events in which D coincides with the
observer C.  The total amount of proper time gone by the body D is not the same as that
of  C;  being  accelerated  the  material  body’s  proper  time  is  given  by  the  general
Minkowski proper time integral ∆τD = ∫ sqrt(1 - (υDA(t)/c)2)dt (here described in terms of
A’s coordinate system). In comparison to C the amount of proper time gone by D is
smaller (see, e.g., Smith 1993, 49-55). However, and importantly for the discussion be-
ing made in this paper, both the now-point of C and the now-point of D are traced using
the coordinate time of A (or B). This is possible because D co-exists with A, B, and C
(e.g. it can be side-by-side with C and it exchanges light with A and B). However since
we lack a further specification of an ‘initial  condition’ regarding the relation of the
phase of D with that of A and B we cannot answer a question like that of what is the ‘ac-
tual’ now-point of A and B when, e.g., C and D coincide and C reads τC2 and D reads
τD2. When A receives back the light reflected by C and D she ‘reconstructs’ her past
now-points that she considers to have been simultaneous to the now-points of C and D
corresponding to their time readings of  τC2 and  τD2.  If B does the same procedure he
will arrive at a different time coordinate. 
Again we face the situation that different inertial observers will consider a different
net/set of now-points to be simultaneous, and it does not seem to be possible in general
to find the ‘actual’ set of simultaneous now-points. For this it seems necessary a further
specification of ‘initial conditions’. This occurs in the very particular case in which the
accelerated body D is side-by-side with A and B at the beginning of the ‘experiment’
and has its phase set to zero simultaneously with A and B. In this case we can answer
the question.  A and B trace the motion of D, e.g., by emitting light pulses to D that are
reflected back. In this way A and B determine the relation between the proper time of
successive now-points of D in relation to their respective coordinate time. This is done,
as mentioned, by ‘reconstruction’: each of them determines her/his past value of the
proper time that is on her/his simultaneity plane passing by the worldline of D, corre-
sponding to its proper time τD.  But let us now consider that, e.g., the now-point of D
corresponding its proper time τD corresponds also to the now-point of a hypothetical in-
ertial observer C (see figure 5).  We imagine C to have her/his phase set to zero simulta-
neously with A, B, and D. Let us say that the proper time along C’s worldline from the
origin to the event corresponding to D’s reading of τD is equal to τC. This implies that
19 Non-inertial reference frames can be used, but their applicability is limited. In simple terms they cannot
cover all the four dimensional space of events (see, e.g. Callahan 2000, 143-165)
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the now-point of D corresponds to a passage of inertial time equal to τC, i.e. we can say
that D’s now-point has an inertial temporal value of τC. The hypothetical observer C is
taken to be physically equivalent to A or B. This means that if C goes through τC sec-
onds, then also A and B have gone by this same amount of time (independently of what,
due to the time dilation, each of them considers to be the simultaneous now-point of the
other). This sets in a unique way the net/set of simultaneous now-points independently
of the observers, as in classical mechanics.
Figure 5
In this quasi-Newtonian situation, conditions 1 to 3 apply to the inertial bodies in ques-
tion (A, B, and C). The proper time of the non-inertial body D unfolds differently from
the inertial time; however there is a one-to-one correspondence between the ‘actual’
now-point of D and the ‘actual’ (identical) now-points of A, B, and C. Since the proper
time of D is determined as a function of the inertial time of one of the inertial observers,
one can consider that its unfolding is a function of the inertial time and its now-point is
determined also by the inertial time. This means that for this particular case, with some
further clarification of the relation of the accelerated body’s proper time to the inertial
time, we see that conditions 1-3 apply also to the case of the accelerated body.
6 Epilogue: the relativity of simultaneity
According to the previous section if we choose, e.g., two inertial observers A and B
whose coordinate systems are defined in a related way by setting their respective initial
phase and origin as the same event, the relation between the now-points of these ob-
servers is clear: the ‘actual’ temporal value of the now-points of the two observers is the
same even if due to the time dilation they might consider that the other observer corre-
sponding now-point is one with a smaller temporal value; i.e. if A’s now-point is the one
with  τA = 10s then B’s now-point is the one with τB = 10s. 
Even if  each observer determines a different net/set of simultaneous now-points
(corresponding to a different determination of the simultaneity plane), they can never-
theless know, by resort to the principle of relativity, that both have now-points with the
same temporal value.
In general, this unique temporal value of the now-points cannot be ‘spread’ to other
inertial bodies. The now-points of these are constrained by their spatial co-existence
with A and B and by the fact that they also unfold according to the inertial time; how-
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ever it does not seem to be possible to determine a unique set of simultaneous now-
points. For this it seems necessary a further specification of an ‘initial condition’ (e.g.,
by a simultaneous setting of the time phase of all material bodies under consideration).
Only in this case we approach a more Newtonian situation in which all the now-points
of the inertial bodies have the same temporal value.  
The case of non-inertial bodies brings more complexity to the issue. Again we face
the situation that in general it does not seem possible to determine a unique net/set of si-
multaneous now-points;  furthermore the unfolding of an accelerated body is  not the
same as that of an inertial body. However, as remarked, this unfolding can be seen as a
function of the inertial time. For the particular case in which an accelerated body has its
phase set to that of the inertial observers A and B we can in fact relate its unfolding
now-point in a unique way to the unfolding now-points of A and B (given by the same
temporal value).
Even if with limitations and a clear difference to the Newtonian case it seems that
there is a place for a notion of flow of time in the theory of relativity along the lines of
Dieks’ proposition.
Having settled in this ‘provisionary’ state of affairs regarding the flow of time in the
theory of relativity, let us return to the issue of the relativity of simultaneity in relation
to the flow of time. Let us consider the special situation in which four inertial observers
in relative motion set their phases to zero when initially side-by-side (see figure 6). 
Figure 6
As it is well known, observer A will take the events along the worldlines of C and D
corresponding, e.g., to TC = TD = 10s to be simultaneous, having in A’s coordinate sys-
tem, e.g., the value TA = 12s; due to the time dilation even if A takes the now-points of C
and D to be simultaneous she attributes to them a value greater than their proper time
readings. In the case of observer B he considers that the events along the worldlines of
C and D corresponding to TC = TD = 10s occur at the different moments TB1 and TB2. Re-
garding the relation between the temporal values of the now-points of C and D and A
and B, both A and B are in a way wrong! When C and D go through 10 seconds, A and
B also go through 10 seconds. 
In general since we do not have the apparently necessary initial condition it seems
impossible to determine, besides the ‘actual’ identical temporal value of the now-points
of A and B, the ‘actual’ temporal values of the now-points of other material bodies. Dif-
ferent observers consider a different net/set of past now-points to have been simultane-
ous. 
As we have seen, this situation does not need to be seen as an impediment to a local
view of the flow of time, for in this case it is unnecessary, as Dieks remarks, to have “a
succession of a definite set of global simultaneity hyperplanes in order to accommodate
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our experience” (Dieks 2006, 160). In Dieks’ view only along each worldline is there a
clear order relation between successive now-points. Accordingly, “this complete linear
order of now-points is the theoretical representation that fits the Newtonian conception
of time” (Dieks 1988, 458). When we consider the relation between the now-points of
different worldlines (i.e. the now-points of different material bodies) their relation is
constrained by the linear order of the successive now-points along each worldline (aris-
ing from the inertial time) and the spatial co-existence of physical systems and pro-
cesses; but in general, as we have seen, this does not result in a unique relation (there
are different sets of now-points taken to be simultaneous depending on the observer).
Dieks refers to this situation as that of having only a partial order in the relation of suc-
cessive now-points of different worldlines (Dieks 1988, 459; Dieks 2006, 171). How-
ever as we also have seen there are cases in which we might consider that this partial or-
der is a linear order falling into the canon of Newton’s conception of time. For this to be
possible we need to consider, e.g., the special case in which different material bodies
(inertial an eventually also non-inertial) are ‘initially’ side-by-side and have their re-
spective temporal/time phase set to the same value.
The relation between the now-points of different inertial observers (related by the
Lorentz transformations) corresponds to this particular case. This means that for all ob-
servers involved in the description of physical events and processes we can keep track
of their now-points: all have the same temporal value as given by the coordinate time.
It is an open issue if we can take more seriously the idea of a three-dimensional
spatial ‘manifold’ in which each material body unfolds according to its proper time. For
particular cases where, e.g., several particles, some inertial others not, ‘departure’ from
the same point at the same time this image seems simple to maintain; for the general
case it is not clear. However we must bear in mind that even the putative general situa-
tion presented in terms of the four-dimensional Minkowski space of events has inbuilt a
particular choice of ‘initial conditions’. One considers the Minkowski space-time coor-
dinatized in terms of two inertial coordinate systems corresponding to two inertial refer-
ence frames that have a coinciding space and time origin. All isolated events or time-
like and light-like worldlines are described at least with this minimum initial condition,
even if in general the time phases of different inertial and non-inertial worldlines are not
set in a non-ambiguous way (i.e. in way in which the relation between the different
now-points taken to be simultaneous does not depend on the chosen coordinate system).
Appendix: interpreting the Minkowski space-time diagrams 
Minkowski’s space-time approach to the theory of relativity was made with resort to a
particular type of diagrams  –  the so-called Minkowski space-time diagrams  –, which
due to their widespread use became influential in the interpretation of the theory, in par-
ticular in relation to the issue that occupies us here, the eventual flow of time. 
In its most basic form, a space-time diagram simply depicts the space-time as coor-
dinatized with a particular inertial coordinate system, which means that we represent a
time axis  and usually  just  one  spatial  axis,  e.g.  an  x-axis.  Then,  in  relation  to  this
adopted coordinate system, we also represent the set of events corresponding to the t’-
axis and the x’-axis of another inertial coordinate system. The depiction of the axes is
complemented, as necessary, with the representation of, e.g., invariant sets of events like
the light cone or hyperboles given by t2 - x2 = k (with k > 0 or k < 0); or one simply rep-
resents, e.g., worldlines of light signals/pulses and worldlines of inertial or non-inertial
material bodies.
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In Minkowski’s original presentation, the space-time diagram was used to provide a
‘graphical’ deduction of the Lorentz transformations between inertial coordinate sys-
tems, and a ‘visual’ presentation of the so-called Lorentz contraction (Minkowski 1908;
Ohanian 2012, 17; Walter 2010, 11-4). In fact, the space-time diagrams provide a very
direct depiction of all the relativistic effects. In this work we used space-time diagrams
in the discussion of the time dilation and the relativity of simultaneity.
There is a view that space-time diagrams express the eternalist block structure of the
Minkowski space-time (see, e.g, Petkov 2005). This precludes any physical notion of
flow of time. It is evident that this view is incompatible with Dieks’ view in terms of a
now-point per worldline. According to Dieks, 
the four-dimensional spacetime diagram records events with their qualities and re-
lations. But in order to be recordable at all, the events in question must occur ...
non-occurring events are evidently not represented in the four-dimensional pic-
ture. (Dieks 2006, 170)
In simple terms we may say that only measured/observed events (i.e. events that have
become) are represented in a space-time diagram. Regarding the flow of time and be-
coming, Dieks concludes that “nothing has to be added to the space-time diagram: the
four-dimensional picture already contains becoming” (Dieks 2006, 174). In this way the
Minkowski diagram represents events that have occurred and have been measured, and
the flow of time is, in a way, ‘inscribed’ in the diagrams.
Let us look in more detail into how Dieks ‘extracts’ the now-points and their rela-
tions from the space-time diagrams. Dieks starts by considering just a space-time dia-
gram representing one worldline. According to Dieks “the idea of flow of time in this
case can be implemented by singling out ‘now-points’ on the worldline” (Dieks 1988,
458). By assigning successive now-points to the worldline, this leads to “an infinitude
of space-time diagrams, individuated by different locations of the now-point” (Dieks
1988, 458). Here we have the case Dieks’ refers to as a Newtonian-like linear-order of
now-points (of the same material body). 
If we have two or more worldlines represented in a space-time diagram the situa-
tion is more complex. We can assign (successive) now-points to each worldline submit-
ted to the restriction that they are representing physical systems that spatially co-exist.
This implies that no now-point is located in the conjunction of the past light cones of
the other now-points. Like in the simpler case of just one worldline we “obtain an in-
finitude  of  space-time  diagrams  each  distinguished  by its  own assignment  of  now-
points” (Dieks 1988, 459). However in this case 
it is not possible to order these diagrams according to the order of the linear con-
tinuum. Instead, our collection of space-time diagrams is a set that is only  par-
tially ordered. The partial order is generated by the usual linear order along world-
lines: there is in general no order relation between diagrams that are generated
from one original diagram by moving the now-points along two different world-
lines. (Dieks 1988, 459)
This does not mean that in any diagram or ‘sequence’ of diagrams in which one explic-
itly represents now-points it is not ‘inscribed’ the flow of time: the diagrams represent
events that have occurred or, less strictly, events that we might expect to occur in a par-
ticular experiment. Also, as mentioned, there are particular cases in which we can ex-
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plicitly represent simultaneously in one space-time diagram (or a sequence of diagrams)
the actual now-points along several worldlines, as already done in this paper.
Another proponent of the view that proper time gives the flow of time is Arthur
(2006, 2008). His view on the space-time diagrams is very similar to Dieks’, even if for-
mulated in part implicitly. According to Arthur, “once we have represented all events
and all processes on a space-time diagram, we have represented all becoming” (Arthur
2006, 135-6). It is evident that in Arthur’s view the diagram is a representation of past
occurring events and processes, which we must consider to have been measured/ob-
served (or expected-future present and past occurring events). Arthur is more explicit in
another remark: 
in constructing a spacetime diagram we represent processes and events, that is,
things that are supposed to have occurred. Becoming – or at least, having become
– is already included in the diagram. (Arthur 2006, 151)
There would be no contradiction between the implementation of the theory of relativity
in terms of the Minkowski space-time using Minkowski diagrams and the view that the
theory of relativity enables a notion of flow of time.
This interpretation of the Minkowski diagrams is not completely new. In fact it can
be found, at least in part, in Bohm’s introductory book on the theory of relativity, even if
Bohm does not address explicitly the flow of time (Bohm 1965). In chapter 31, entitled
“the significance of the Minkowski diagram as a reconstruction of the past”,  Bohm
presents a view on the Minkowski diagrams that is similar to Dieks’ and Arthur’s views.
Bohm asks us to consider an ‘observer’ at rest in a laboratory (taken to be an inertial ref-
erence frame). In a Minkowski diagram we represent the observer as a straight line OA
(see figure 7). Let us consider that for the observer ‘now’ corresponds to the event P. 
Figure 7
According to Bohm, the observer “cannot survey the whole Minkowski diagram. On the
contrary, he can only know of events that are inside his past light cone” (Bohm 1965,
174). If we imagine that the observer is measuring/determining the worldline of a parti-
cle, when ‘now’ at P the observer has information regarding the particle only up to event
V. According to Bohm, the observer 
can  reasonably assume that  the  particle  continues  to  exist  on the  line  VW,
which is the extension of OV into the region outside the light cone of P ... but
this projected picture is always subjected to contingencies. (Bohm 1965, 176)
19
 The Bohm-Minkowski diagram can be seen as a reconstruction in a mathematical space
representing events (i.e. length and duration measurements) of past measurements or ex-
pected-future present and past events, like the worldline VW (resulting from future mea-
surements/observations). In this way it includes, even if implicitly, a reference to now-
points and the flow of time. For example, in the Bohm-Minkowski diagram of figure 7
it is represent: (1) the now-point P of an observer; (2) past events inside her/his past
light cone, like the (past) worldline OV; (3) expected-future present and past events,
like the future now-points of A (implicit in the vertical axis) and the worldline VW.
This view makes it necessary to be careful in the interpretation of measurement re-
sults (or theoretical predictions) as represented in a diagram, in particular if one forgets
about how the diagram is obtained and that in its construction is implicit the flow of
time and the notion of now. In the diagram we can represented not yet observed ex-
pected future events,  but we do not have to conclude from this that the Minkowski
space-time and the Minkowski diagram imply a block universe in which all past and fu-
ture are given all at once, as Dieks (2006) and Arthur (2006) call our attention to. 
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